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I warmly thank the editor for the opportunity to reply. 
I shall highlight three technical differences between 
Professor Quigley’s and my positions, then conclude 
with the major theoretical difference.
1) Professor Quigley cites no statute, case law, or legal 
theory supporting his interpretation of the law. 
He states that a pastoral runholder may ‘acquire 
the freehold rights’ at the end of a lease’s term. By 
contrast, the law firmly establishes the Crown as the 
ultimate owner of Crown land (Page and Brower 
2007).  The Land Act 1948 s. 66(2) and the Crown 
Pastoral Land Act 1998 s. 4(c, d) state that the 
runholder has ‘no right to the soil; and no right to 
acquire the fee simple of any of the land.’    
2) Professor Quigley argues that tenure review is a 
nationalization because more land is conserved 
than privatised. Though Professor Quigley describes 
farmers as ‘giving up’ high country land to transfer 
into conservation, farmers give up grazing rights 
not land. It is incorrect to describe tenure review 
as a nationalization because the Crown owned all 
the land before the review, and owns less than half2 
after the review. It is a partial shift in land use and 
property rights, from pastoralism to conservation, 
but not a nationalization. However it is correct to say 
that land passing from Crown ownership to private 
ownership is privatized. 
3) Professor Quigley argues that the results reported in 
Brower, Meguire, and Monks (in review) are artifacts 
of the construction of the dependent variable. 
In preparing that paper, we experimented with 
several dependent variables, including the straight 
ratio which he prefers. According to an economic 
interpretation of property as a bundle of rights and 
tenure review as an exchange of property rights, 
a scatterplot of each dependent variable we tried 
should yield a horizontal line. No matter the algebra 
1 I gratefully acknowledge the contribution of my colleagues Philip 
Meguire and Adrian Monks and the helpful suggestions of the 
reviewer. This research was funded by Fulbright-New Zealand and 
Lincoln University.
2 To 2008, tenure review runholders have acquired title to 
270,082 hectares, and the Crown shifted 196,728 hectares from 
pastoralism to conservation. Hence 58% of tenure review land has 
been privatised.
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of the dependent variable, every scatterplot revealed 
a diagonal; hence our results are robust.
4) Finally, Professor Quigley and I appear to differ 
over a point of basic economics regarding the values 
exchanged in tenure review. He argues, as others 
have (Armstrong et al 2007: paragraph 19.6), 
that the option to develop newly privatised land 
should not influence prices paid in tenure review, 
because the Crown cannot exercise the development 
option whilst the land is under lease. Hence the 
development option has no value in the exchange 
(Evans and Quigley 2006: 3). 
By contrast, Adam Smith argued in The Wealth of 
Nations that a good might be useless to the current 
owner yet still command a high selling price because 
the purchaser thinks it would be useful.
The things which have the greatest value in use 
have frequently little or no value in exchange; and 
on the contrary, those which have the greatest 
value in exchange have frequently little or no 
value in use. Nothing is more useful than water: 
but it will purchase scarce any thing; scarce any 
thing can be had in exchange for it. A diamond, 
on the contrary, has scarce any value in use; 
but a very great quantity of other goods may 
frequently be had in exchange for it. (Smith 
1776: chapter 4) (emphasis added)
The runholder’s pastoral rights are like Smith’s water; 
the development option is like the diamond. To argue 
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3 Put another way, if a hypothetical Sam owns a titanium bicycle 
then suffers an incurable wrist injury which renders him unable to 
cycle ever again, the bicycle ceases to have a positive value in use. 
But this does not mean that Sam should give the bicycle away, or 
pay someone to take it away, as the Crown has often done under 
tenure review. Either course of action would be far more generous 
than Smith’s discussion would predict, because a titanium bicycle’s 
value in exchange is unaffected by the cycling abilities of its current 
owner. Because Sam will never ride it again, he may be willing to 
sell it for less than an avid cyclist would. This would lower, but not 
extinguish, its value in exchange. 
that the development option is irrelevant is to assume 
that the value in use equals the value in exchange. 
Microeconomics posits that this is rarely true, if ever 
(Hirshleifer et al 2005: chapters 3-5).3
The Crown may have no immediate use for the 
development option, but advertised land prices 
around Queenstown and Wanaka suggest that the 
development option has a high value in use to the 
new landowners. Hence freehold land in the high 
country should command a high value in exchange, 
and the Crown’s selling price should be high. Until 
2007, the Crown’s generosity towards pastoral 
runholders in tenure review was difficult to reconcile 
with Smith’s reasoning. 
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